1 00:00:07,374 --> 00:00:09,642 SPEAKER 1: Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 2 00:00:09,709 --> 00:00:11,077 SPEAKER 2: We lost both engines! 3 00:00:11,144 --> 00:00:12,679 SPEAKER 3: Don't be alarmed, emergency detected. 4 00:00:12,746 --> 00:00:13,480 SPEAKER 4: Mayday! Mayday! 5 00:00:13,546 --> 00:00:15,415 SPEAKER 5: Brace for impact! 6 00:00:15,482 --> 00:00:16,916 SPEAKER 6: I think I lost one. 7 00:00:16,983 --> 00:00:19,419 SPEAKER 7: Investigations start-- 8 00:00:19,486 --> 00:00:20,954 SPEAKER 8: It's gonna crash! 9 00:00:31,464 --> 00:00:34,134 NARRATOR: Modern airliners are among the most complex and 10 00:00:34,200 --> 00:00:36,836 reliable machines in the world. 11 00:00:36,903 --> 00:00:40,807 Their safety record is high, and dangerous incidents are rare. 12 00:00:40,874 --> 00:00:43,543 But when they do happen, aviation authorities 13 00:00:43,610 --> 00:00:45,678 commit to finding the cause. 14 00:00:45,745 --> 00:00:47,414 It's rarely easy. 15 00:00:47,480 --> 00:00:51,050 This is the story of one such investigation. 16 00:00:51,117 --> 00:00:54,354 When a 747 suffered a devastating explosion 17 00:00:54,421 --> 00:00:57,223 at high altitude, the crew and passengers 18 00:00:57,290 --> 00:01:00,560 faced an unprecedented crisis, and 19 00:01:00,627 --> 00:01:02,962 one family's grief helped authorities 20 00:01:03,029 --> 00:01:04,230 uncover the full truth. 21 00:01:09,135 --> 00:01:10,970 KEVIN CAMPBELL: Lee kind of died for nothing. 22 00:01:11,037 --> 00:01:13,706 You know, you've got to find out why he died, 23 00:01:13,773 --> 00:01:19,412 and you've just got to make sure that it never happens again. 24 00:01:19,479 --> 00:01:21,714 NARRATOR: Hawaii is a natural stop for any flight 25 00:01:21,781 --> 00:01:22,615 across the Pacific. 26 00:01:25,718 --> 00:01:28,521 On this morning, a United 747 was 27 00:01:28,588 --> 00:01:30,790 undergoing routine inspection for a trip 28 00:01:30,857 --> 00:01:31,925 to Auckland, New Zealand. 29 00:01:36,830 --> 00:01:39,899 But as flight 811 prepared for takeoff, 30 00:01:39,966 --> 00:01:42,769 everyone's guard is up. 31 00:01:42,836 --> 00:01:46,005 Just a few months earlier, a terrorist bomb had brought down 32 00:01:46,072 --> 00:01:48,575 a 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland. 33 00:01:48,641 --> 00:01:50,777 LAURA BRENTLINGER: We were in the aftermath of Lockerbie, 34 00:01:50,844 --> 00:01:53,980 and I had instructed the crew to be particularly aware, 35 00:01:54,047 --> 00:01:57,984 because it was a through flight from Los Angeles 36 00:01:58,051 --> 00:02:00,019 going through to New Zealand. 37 00:02:00,086 --> 00:02:02,789 So in my pre-flight briefing, I'd 38 00:02:02,856 --> 00:02:06,593 asked them to make sure that they checked any baggage that 39 00:02:06,659 --> 00:02:09,596 looked suspicious or anything, because we 40 00:02:09,662 --> 00:02:13,433 wanted to be extra cautious. 41 00:02:13,500 --> 00:02:16,002 NARRATOR: Flight 811 was heavily loaded. 42 00:02:16,069 --> 00:02:20,507 337 passengers packed cargo holds and a full fuel load. 43 00:02:25,378 --> 00:02:28,281 The doors closed on time, and the plane left the gate 44 00:02:28,348 --> 00:02:30,517 just before 2:00 in the morning, for 45 00:02:30,583 --> 00:02:32,051 a routine eight-hour flight. 46 00:02:35,054 --> 00:02:37,757 LINDA BAHNA: Well, we were going to New Zealand on vacation, 47 00:02:37,824 --> 00:02:41,861 someplace that we had really thought was interesting, 48 00:02:41,928 --> 00:02:43,830 and somebody had told us how beautiful it was. 49 00:02:43,897 --> 00:02:48,501 So this was kind of a dream come true. 50 00:02:48,568 --> 00:02:51,437 BRUCE LAMPERT: I was seated in what's called the upper deck. 51 00:02:51,504 --> 00:02:53,773 I hadn't had a vacation in five years, 52 00:02:53,840 --> 00:02:56,809 and I took all my MileagePlus points from United Airlines, 53 00:02:56,876 --> 00:03:00,346 and I purchased a business-class ticket to Auckland, New 54 00:03:00,413 --> 00:03:02,115 Zealand, and Sydney, Australia. 55 00:03:02,181 --> 00:03:04,183 I was going to finally make that dream vacation 56 00:03:04,250 --> 00:03:05,218 I'd always wanted-- 57 00:03:05,285 --> 00:03:07,387 to get to Australia and lay on a beach 58 00:03:07,453 --> 00:03:09,589 somewhere, and forget about airplanes, 59 00:03:09,656 --> 00:03:12,492 forget about accidents, and get this 60 00:03:12,559 --> 00:03:13,760 out of my mind for a while. 61 00:03:23,369 --> 00:03:24,771 NARRATOR: On the flight deck captain, 62 00:03:24,837 --> 00:03:28,207 Dave Cronin was hugely experienced, just 63 00:03:28,274 --> 00:03:30,143 two months short of retirement. 64 00:03:30,209 --> 00:03:31,010 Rotate. 65 00:03:36,950 --> 00:03:40,486 DAVID CRONIN: I flew almost 35 years with United. 66 00:03:40,553 --> 00:03:42,789 I've got over 30,000 hours of flight time 67 00:03:42,855 --> 00:03:49,262 and just about everything military as well as civilian. 68 00:03:49,329 --> 00:03:53,399 My co-pilot, our first officer, was Al Slader. 69 00:03:53,466 --> 00:03:59,639 And I'd known Al at that time for probably 20 years. 70 00:03:59,706 --> 00:04:02,575 And the second officer, Mark Thomas-- 71 00:04:02,642 --> 00:04:05,111 was the first time I had flown with him, 72 00:04:05,178 --> 00:04:09,349 but we got along real well. 73 00:04:09,415 --> 00:04:11,551 Tell them we can handle 33 if it's available. 74 00:04:11,618 --> 00:04:12,518 OK. 75 00:04:12,585 --> 00:04:13,920 NARRATOR: The pilots wanted to climb 76 00:04:13,987 --> 00:04:17,657 to 33,000 feet above the Pacific Ocean to avoid turbulence. 77 00:04:17,724 --> 00:04:19,792 OK, it looks like 196 put us direct-- 78 00:04:19,859 --> 00:04:22,362 DAVID CRONIN: We did notice that there were thunderstorms 79 00:04:22,428 --> 00:04:25,999 100 miles south, right on course, which was rather 80 00:04:26,065 --> 00:04:28,334 unusual for that time of night. 81 00:04:28,401 --> 00:04:32,639 So I left the seatbelt sign on. 82 00:04:32,705 --> 00:04:34,240 NARRATOR: Captain Cronin's decision 83 00:04:34,307 --> 00:04:39,812 to keep people fastened in their seats would save many lives. 84 00:04:39,879 --> 00:04:41,347 LAURA BRENTLINGER: We were still climbing out, 85 00:04:41,414 --> 00:04:43,282 and the seatbelt sign was still on, 86 00:04:43,349 --> 00:04:47,587 and just basically, getting ready to serve beverages, 87 00:04:47,654 --> 00:04:49,222 and then to tuck everyone in for the evening, 88 00:04:49,288 --> 00:04:51,024 because it was going to be a long flight down 89 00:04:51,090 --> 00:04:52,892 to New Zealand. 90 00:04:52,959 --> 00:04:55,995 OK, tell them we're going to detour over to left. 91 00:04:56,062 --> 00:04:57,597 Center, United 811, heavy. 92 00:04:57,664 --> 00:04:58,698 We're going to be detouring. 93 00:04:58,765 --> 00:05:00,133 Some weather here. 94 00:05:00,199 --> 00:05:02,402 It'll be to the left of course. 95 00:05:02,468 --> 00:05:05,738 NARRATOR: 100 miles from Honolulu, as flight 811 96 00:05:05,805 --> 00:05:09,442 climbed through 23,000 feet, a huge malfunction 97 00:05:09,509 --> 00:05:12,045 was about to occur. 98 00:05:12,111 --> 00:05:15,548 There was now a big air pressure difference between the inside 99 00:05:15,615 --> 00:05:18,151 and the outside of the aircraft. 100 00:05:18,217 --> 00:05:21,721 Suddenly, passengers sitting just above and behind the cargo 101 00:05:21,788 --> 00:05:23,589 door heard a noise. 102 00:05:23,656 --> 00:05:25,958 LINDA BAHNA: Then, it was kind of a grinding noise. 103 00:05:31,631 --> 00:05:33,332 I heard, like, a thud. 104 00:05:37,170 --> 00:05:38,071 The hell? 105 00:05:38,137 --> 00:05:40,907 In the next nanosecond, it was pure, 106 00:05:40,973 --> 00:05:43,409 unadulterated pandemonium. 107 00:05:52,285 --> 00:05:53,653 We lost number three. 108 00:05:53,720 --> 00:05:54,821 Going down. 109 00:05:54,887 --> 00:05:56,422 It looks like we've lost number three engine, 110 00:05:56,489 --> 00:05:58,057 and we're descending rapidly. 111 00:05:58,124 --> 00:05:58,925 Coming back. 112 00:06:02,161 --> 00:06:06,065 The next thing I knew, I found myself on the stairwell, 113 00:06:06,132 --> 00:06:09,335 hanging on to the rungs, and I immediately knew it 114 00:06:09,402 --> 00:06:11,170 was an explosive decompression. 115 00:06:13,873 --> 00:06:15,641 NARRATOR: The cargo door had torn off 116 00:06:15,708 --> 00:06:18,711 and ripped a large section of the plane with it. 117 00:06:18,778 --> 00:06:21,214 The pressurized air inside had blasted 118 00:06:21,280 --> 00:06:23,983 out with explosive force. 119 00:06:24,050 --> 00:06:25,852 I immediately thought of Lockerbie. 120 00:06:25,918 --> 00:06:29,722 We actually thought it was a bomb that went off. 121 00:06:29,789 --> 00:06:31,824 BRUCE LAMPERT: It was hell on earth. 122 00:06:31,891 --> 00:06:33,593 Everything on the airplane that wasn't 123 00:06:33,659 --> 00:06:38,965 fastened down, tied down, or secured became airborne. 124 00:06:39,031 --> 00:06:40,833 The noise was incredible. 125 00:06:43,703 --> 00:06:45,404 BOB BAHNA: Everything in front of us was gone. 126 00:06:45,471 --> 00:06:48,941 Where we were sitting, we were about 6 inches from the hole, 127 00:06:49,008 --> 00:06:52,245 so there was nothing in front of us or to the side of us. 128 00:06:52,311 --> 00:06:54,280 The whole side of the plane was gone. 129 00:06:54,347 --> 00:06:56,349 Actually, our feet were dangling on the hole. 130 00:06:56,415 --> 00:06:59,652 And my first thought-- we weren't going to make it. 131 00:06:59,719 --> 00:07:03,923 You know, I just didn't think there was any hope. 132 00:07:03,990 --> 00:07:06,092 NARRATOR: With the pressurized air blown out, 133 00:07:06,159 --> 00:07:08,561 the lack of oxygen at 23,000 feet 134 00:07:08,628 --> 00:07:11,931 was now suffocating the passengers and the crew. 135 00:07:11,998 --> 00:07:14,367 It felt like someone had kicked me in the stomach 136 00:07:14,433 --> 00:07:16,369 and knocked the wind out of me. 137 00:07:16,435 --> 00:07:23,276 And I remember trying to catch my breath, and couldn't. 138 00:07:23,342 --> 00:07:25,478 You're supposed to wrap those oxygen masks 139 00:07:25,545 --> 00:07:28,915 and put them on, except the oxygen masks in that cabin-- 140 00:07:28,981 --> 00:07:30,750 they were ripped out of the ceiling, and they 141 00:07:30,817 --> 00:07:32,285 weren't-- they weren't there. 142 00:07:32,351 --> 00:07:35,121 And I remember thinking to myself, 143 00:07:35,188 --> 00:07:37,557 this is what it feels like to suffocate. 144 00:07:37,623 --> 00:07:38,624 United know, 811 heavy. 145 00:07:38,691 --> 00:07:41,093 We're doing an emergency descent. 146 00:07:41,160 --> 00:07:43,262 NARRATOR: The pilots could tell from their instruments 147 00:07:43,329 --> 00:07:45,531 that the number-three engine was failing, 148 00:07:45,598 --> 00:07:48,334 but they couldn't tell the full extent of the damage. 149 00:07:48,401 --> 00:07:51,304 Their priority was to get the plane down to a level where 150 00:07:51,370 --> 00:07:53,039 they could breathe normally. 151 00:07:53,105 --> 00:07:54,140 Put your mask on, Dave. 152 00:07:57,610 --> 00:07:59,111 NARRATOR: But the pilots didn't know 153 00:07:59,178 --> 00:08:03,983 that the explosion had destroyed the entire oxygen supply. 154 00:08:04,050 --> 00:08:05,284 Can't get any oxygen. 155 00:08:05,351 --> 00:08:06,552 We're not getting any oxygen! 156 00:08:06,619 --> 00:08:07,353 Are you getting any? 157 00:08:07,420 --> 00:08:09,222 I can't get any either. 158 00:08:09,288 --> 00:08:11,390 NARRATOR: With the plane heading steeply down 159 00:08:11,457 --> 00:08:13,860 and no word from the cockpit, the cabin 160 00:08:13,926 --> 00:08:15,895 crew were thinking the worst. 161 00:08:15,962 --> 00:08:18,531 I remember thinking that the cockpit, which 162 00:08:18,598 --> 00:08:20,833 is up in the upper deck, had probably 163 00:08:20,900 --> 00:08:22,235 blown off the airplane, too. 164 00:08:22,301 --> 00:08:26,772 Because as far up as we could see, there was nothing there. 165 00:08:26,839 --> 00:08:29,909 Now, we're doing this nose dive. 166 00:08:29,976 --> 00:08:32,945 My next thought was, oh my god, we're just going straight down. 167 00:08:33,012 --> 00:08:36,048 We're going to crash into the sea. 168 00:08:36,115 --> 00:08:37,717 NARRATOR: With the airplane ruptured, 169 00:08:37,783 --> 00:08:40,953 severe damage to the right wing and engines, and its crew 170 00:08:41,020 --> 00:08:43,923 forcing it down to an emergency descent, 171 00:08:43,990 --> 00:08:46,792 the problems on flight 811 had only just begun. 172 00:08:55,768 --> 00:08:59,105 Two minutes after suffering a devastating explosion, 173 00:08:59,171 --> 00:09:03,242 flight 811 was still in a steep emergency descent, 174 00:09:03,309 --> 00:09:07,513 passing rapidly through 15,000 feet to reach breathable air. 175 00:09:07,580 --> 00:09:10,316 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811 heavy, say your altitude now. 176 00:09:10,383 --> 00:09:11,450 Believe me, 15. 177 00:09:11,517 --> 00:09:14,787 United 811, heavy, we're out of 15.5. 178 00:09:14,854 --> 00:09:17,056 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811, roger. 179 00:09:17,123 --> 00:09:18,791 I think we blew a door or something. 180 00:09:18,858 --> 00:09:21,460 Tell the flight attendant to get prepared for an evacuation. 181 00:09:21,527 --> 00:09:23,162 NARRATOR: The crew finally began to level 182 00:09:23,229 --> 00:09:25,765 out at a safer altitude. 183 00:09:25,831 --> 00:09:30,236 But they now faced a barrage of problems. 184 00:09:30,303 --> 00:09:32,438 The most immediate was the disintegration 185 00:09:32,505 --> 00:09:35,341 of the number-three engine nearest to the explosion. 186 00:09:38,010 --> 00:09:40,446 We don't have any fire indications? 187 00:09:40,513 --> 00:09:44,050 I-- I don't have anything. 188 00:09:44,116 --> 00:09:46,285 OK, we lost number three. 189 00:09:46,352 --> 00:09:47,286 Let's shut it down. 190 00:09:47,353 --> 00:09:48,321 There's no N-1. 191 00:09:48,387 --> 00:09:49,755 Yeah, OK. 192 00:09:49,822 --> 00:09:52,258 Ready for number-three shutdown checklist. 193 00:09:56,195 --> 00:10:00,132 Before you shut down number three, the generator went off. 194 00:10:00,199 --> 00:10:01,634 Looks all right to try it now. 195 00:10:10,543 --> 00:10:12,411 Well, that stopped the vibration anyway. 196 00:10:12,478 --> 00:10:13,679 Feel jettison procedure. 197 00:10:13,746 --> 00:10:15,881 Main boost pumps. 198 00:10:15,948 --> 00:10:17,550 Center, United 811. 199 00:10:17,616 --> 00:10:19,118 We need the equipment standing by. 200 00:10:19,185 --> 00:10:20,286 Company notified, please. 201 00:10:20,353 --> 00:10:22,388 We got a control problem. 202 00:10:22,455 --> 00:10:25,291 Center-wing, left-right valves, on. 203 00:10:25,358 --> 00:10:26,625 Start dumping the fuel. 204 00:10:26,692 --> 00:10:27,827 I am dumping. 205 00:10:30,129 --> 00:10:33,799 One stewardess was seriously injured by falling debris. 206 00:10:33,866 --> 00:10:36,802 As Laura Brentlinger helped her, the full gravity 207 00:10:36,869 --> 00:10:39,739 of this situation suddenly became clear. 208 00:10:39,805 --> 00:10:42,174 As I'm holding her in my arms, I looked up, 209 00:10:42,241 --> 00:10:44,110 and as I looked up, that was the first time 210 00:10:44,176 --> 00:10:46,879 I saw this tremendous hole on the side 211 00:10:46,946 --> 00:10:51,384 of the aircraft that was just a void, and seats were missing. 212 00:10:51,450 --> 00:10:54,153 And I immediately knew that we had lost passengers. 213 00:10:57,123 --> 00:10:58,824 NARRATOR: Five rows of seats had been 214 00:10:58,891 --> 00:11:03,095 blown out in the decompression, killing nine passengers. 215 00:11:03,162 --> 00:11:06,265 On the flight deck, the crew had turned the stricken plane back 216 00:11:06,332 --> 00:11:09,635 to Honolulu, but with 80 miles still to go, 217 00:11:09,702 --> 00:11:12,204 the crisis now got far worse. 218 00:11:12,271 --> 00:11:14,707 We got a hell of a control problem here. 219 00:11:14,774 --> 00:11:16,308 I got almost full rudder on this thing. 220 00:11:16,375 --> 00:11:17,610 Are you dumping as fast as you can? 221 00:11:17,676 --> 00:11:19,078 I'm dumping everything. 222 00:11:19,145 --> 00:11:21,414 We got a problem with number-four engine? 223 00:11:21,480 --> 00:11:22,548 Yeah. 224 00:11:22,615 --> 00:11:24,550 NARRATOR: Debris from the explosion that also 225 00:11:24,617 --> 00:11:26,819 damaged the number-four engine. 226 00:11:26,886 --> 00:11:30,623 If it failed completely, the implications would be severe. 227 00:11:30,689 --> 00:11:34,560 If you are on two engines and you weigh 700,000 pounds, 228 00:11:34,627 --> 00:11:36,896 that is a big deal. 229 00:11:36,962 --> 00:11:39,532 Simply because with that kind of weight, 230 00:11:39,598 --> 00:11:43,002 two engines are not going to keep you in the air. 231 00:11:43,069 --> 00:11:43,936 You're going to come down. 232 00:11:48,607 --> 00:11:51,310 NARRATOR: Although their number-four engine was failing, 233 00:11:51,377 --> 00:11:53,579 the pilots pushed it along with the remaining 234 00:11:53,646 --> 00:11:55,414 engines to full power-- 235 00:11:55,481 --> 00:11:58,484 a setting they should not run up for more than four minutes. 236 00:11:58,551 --> 00:12:01,921 But the nearest land was 15 minutes away. 237 00:12:01,987 --> 00:12:04,457 I look out the window on the right-hand side, 238 00:12:04,523 --> 00:12:08,027 and I see flames, big flames. 239 00:12:08,094 --> 00:12:10,296 And I know what flames in engine means. 240 00:12:10,362 --> 00:12:11,597 It's not good. 241 00:12:11,664 --> 00:12:13,099 NARRATOR: The pilots were unaware 242 00:12:13,165 --> 00:12:15,968 that the number-four engine was now on fire. 243 00:12:16,035 --> 00:12:17,336 You've got 250 knots now. 244 00:12:17,403 --> 00:12:18,137 That's good. 245 00:12:18,204 --> 00:12:19,438 7,000-- 246 00:12:19,505 --> 00:12:21,373 Yeah, we're getting more rumble. 247 00:12:21,440 --> 00:12:22,241 Watch your heading. 248 00:12:22,308 --> 00:12:23,075 Watch your heading. 249 00:12:23,142 --> 00:12:24,210 You want to go direct Honolulu. 250 00:12:24,276 --> 00:12:25,611 OK. 251 00:12:25,678 --> 00:12:27,513 I'm going to go downstairs and see what the hell is going on. 252 00:12:27,580 --> 00:12:28,714 Yeah. 253 00:12:28,781 --> 00:12:31,350 Go ahead and run down and see what's happening. 254 00:12:31,417 --> 00:12:33,385 LAURA BRENTLINGER: I saw the flight engineer 255 00:12:33,452 --> 00:12:36,555 descend down the stairwell. 256 00:12:36,622 --> 00:12:41,227 And when I saw him, my relief was, oh my god, they're alive. 257 00:12:41,293 --> 00:12:44,230 And there was a huge sense of relief for me. 258 00:12:44,296 --> 00:12:47,466 He saw the hole, turned as white as a sheet, 259 00:12:47,533 --> 00:12:50,402 and I screamed to him, dear god, please get us down. 260 00:12:52,905 --> 00:12:54,373 We've got a fire out there. 261 00:12:54,440 --> 00:12:57,376 Oh, yeah, we got a fire in number four. 262 00:12:57,443 --> 00:12:58,677 Go through the procedure. 263 00:12:58,744 --> 00:13:00,012 Shut down the engine. 264 00:13:00,079 --> 00:13:01,647 We're not going to be able to hold this altitude on two. 265 00:13:09,021 --> 00:13:11,223 We got a fire on the right side. 266 00:13:11,290 --> 00:13:12,558 We're on two engines now. 267 00:13:12,625 --> 00:13:14,994 The whole right side-- it's just gone from about the one 268 00:13:15,060 --> 00:13:16,962 right back to-- it's just open. 269 00:13:17,029 --> 00:13:18,564 You're just looking outside. 270 00:13:18,631 --> 00:13:19,365 What do you mean? 271 00:13:19,431 --> 00:13:20,299 It looks like a bomb. 272 00:13:20,366 --> 00:13:21,100 Fuselage? 273 00:13:21,167 --> 00:13:21,967 Yeah, the fuselage. 274 00:13:22,034 --> 00:13:23,102 It's just-- it's just open. 275 00:13:27,439 --> 00:13:29,275 OK, it looks like we got a bomb that 276 00:13:29,341 --> 00:13:31,544 went off on the right side. 277 00:13:31,610 --> 00:13:32,912 The whole right side is gone. 278 00:13:32,978 --> 00:13:36,048 Yeah, from-- from about the one right back to-- 279 00:13:36,115 --> 00:13:38,884 Anybody--? 280 00:13:38,951 --> 00:13:40,019 Some people are probably gone. 281 00:13:40,085 --> 00:13:40,886 I don't know. 282 00:13:44,957 --> 00:13:46,792 I knew that we had lost people. 283 00:13:46,859 --> 00:13:49,562 I didn't know how many. 284 00:13:49,628 --> 00:13:53,666 In fact, I didn't know until the next day how many were lost. 285 00:13:53,732 --> 00:13:58,537 But you know, it's a terrible thing 286 00:13:58,604 --> 00:13:59,972 when you're a captain of an airplane 287 00:14:00,039 --> 00:14:01,807 and you lose passengers. 288 00:14:08,247 --> 00:14:10,482 NARRATOR: Lee Campbell, flying home to New Zealand, 289 00:14:10,549 --> 00:14:13,485 was sitting in row 10 just in front of the cargo door. 290 00:14:17,223 --> 00:14:22,494 I woke up with such a start, because I'd seen Lee standing 291 00:14:22,561 --> 00:14:26,765 by the bed, just with a gray jacket over his arm 292 00:14:26,832 --> 00:14:29,235 and a small smile on his face. 293 00:14:29,301 --> 00:14:33,072 Of course, as I woke up, it faded slowly, uh-- 294 00:14:33,138 --> 00:14:36,041 And then, we woke up in the morning, and we discussed this. 295 00:14:36,108 --> 00:14:38,344 I said, oh, it was strange in the night, 296 00:14:38,410 --> 00:14:41,814 but it's such a vivid dream. 297 00:14:41,880 --> 00:14:44,984 Lee was standing there. 298 00:14:45,050 --> 00:14:50,256 And then, the radio came on, and the first item of news 299 00:14:50,322 --> 00:14:54,660 is that there'd been problem with a United aircraft. 300 00:14:54,727 --> 00:14:56,996 And I said, that was Lee. 301 00:14:57,062 --> 00:15:00,232 It's Lee, and my blood just ran cold. 302 00:15:00,299 --> 00:15:02,635 I knew he was dead, from that moment. 303 00:15:08,841 --> 00:15:10,476 Center, do you read? 304 00:15:10,542 --> 00:15:12,544 We evidently had a bomb or something. 305 00:15:12,611 --> 00:15:14,213 A big section of the right sidebar of the airplane 306 00:15:14,280 --> 00:15:16,015 is missing. 307 00:15:16,081 --> 00:15:17,549 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): Unite 811, heavy, roger. 308 00:15:17,616 --> 00:15:21,020 I wouldn't go any faster than I had to, because that hole-- 309 00:15:21,086 --> 00:15:22,955 I mean, I wouldn't get it over 250 knots, 310 00:15:23,022 --> 00:15:23,922 because that's a big-- 311 00:15:23,989 --> 00:15:25,958 OK, what's-- what's our stall speed? 312 00:15:26,025 --> 00:15:27,726 I wouldn't go below 240. 313 00:15:27,793 --> 00:15:29,395 Yeah. 314 00:15:29,461 --> 00:15:31,130 I don't know if we're going to make this. 315 00:15:31,196 --> 00:15:33,799 We didn't know that we were going to make it back, 316 00:15:33,866 --> 00:15:36,935 so we were actually preparing to ditch that airplane 317 00:15:37,002 --> 00:15:40,306 at night in the Pacific Ocean, which 318 00:15:40,372 --> 00:15:42,908 has never been done before. 319 00:15:42,975 --> 00:15:46,145 NARRATOR: In the cabin, the crew prepared for the worst. 320 00:15:46,211 --> 00:15:47,513 LAURA BRENTLINGER: My training kicked in, 321 00:15:47,579 --> 00:15:51,617 and I got up from my jump seat and started 322 00:15:51,684 --> 00:15:54,253 instructing the crew. 323 00:15:54,320 --> 00:15:55,721 We have to prepare the cabin. 324 00:15:55,788 --> 00:15:58,257 We have to prepare for a ditching, 325 00:15:58,324 --> 00:16:00,626 which I thought was inevitable. 326 00:16:04,196 --> 00:16:05,864 You're running around getting life vests on, 327 00:16:05,931 --> 00:16:08,467 and I do remember thinking, I'm not 328 00:16:08,534 --> 00:16:10,269 sure this is going to matter. 329 00:16:10,336 --> 00:16:14,073 Because when we hit the water, you know, 330 00:16:14,139 --> 00:16:15,808 I just imagine planes getting split apart. 331 00:16:19,511 --> 00:16:21,180 I knew that if we hit the water, 332 00:16:21,246 --> 00:16:22,881 it'd be tantamount to hitting the ground, 333 00:16:22,948 --> 00:16:25,250 and there would be very few, if any, survivors. 334 00:16:25,317 --> 00:16:27,386 So my mind went to-- 335 00:16:32,391 --> 00:16:35,627 the thing that meant something to me, and at that point 336 00:16:35,694 --> 00:16:36,795 in my life, it was my son. 337 00:16:39,331 --> 00:16:41,367 NARRATOR: Believing they were going to die, 338 00:16:41,433 --> 00:16:44,036 one of the passengers took these photographs. 339 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:51,844 For 15 minutes, the plane steadily lost altitude. 340 00:16:51,910 --> 00:16:56,715 Then, at 4,000 feet, there was a glimmer of hope. 341 00:16:56,782 --> 00:17:01,220 After an imponderable time, I remember one of the passengers 342 00:17:01,286 --> 00:17:05,290 began to point out one of the windows on the right side. 343 00:17:05,357 --> 00:17:08,660 And everybody looked, and we looked to this little window 344 00:17:08,727 --> 00:17:13,132 from wherever we were, and we could see a point of light, 345 00:17:13,198 --> 00:17:15,401 and another point of light, and another point. 346 00:17:15,467 --> 00:17:17,970 Pretty soon, you could make out of coastline. 347 00:17:18,036 --> 00:17:20,105 OK, I've got lights over here. 348 00:17:20,172 --> 00:17:21,707 OK. 349 00:17:21,774 --> 00:17:22,574 OK. 350 00:17:22,641 --> 00:17:23,909 We're at 4. 351 00:17:23,976 --> 00:17:26,011 We're 21 miles out. 352 00:17:26,078 --> 00:17:26,879 We're in good shape. 353 00:17:29,515 --> 00:17:32,785 NARRATOR: At Honolulu Airport, an emergency was declared. 354 00:17:32,851 --> 00:17:34,820 All other aircraft were diverted, 355 00:17:34,887 --> 00:17:37,589 and the rescue services prepared for the crash landing 356 00:17:37,656 --> 00:17:38,891 of a fully loaded airliner. 357 00:17:44,897 --> 00:17:46,131 Hey, you want to give me some speeds? 358 00:17:46,198 --> 00:17:48,133 Yeah. 359 00:17:48,200 --> 00:17:52,604 150 is going to be your two engine. 360 00:17:52,671 --> 00:17:53,906 Use a 160. 361 00:17:53,972 --> 00:17:54,706 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811, I need souls on board, 362 00:17:54,773 --> 00:17:55,707 if you have it. 363 00:17:55,774 --> 00:17:57,309 OK, souls on board. 364 00:17:57,376 --> 00:17:59,011 160 is the minimum. 365 00:17:59,077 --> 00:18:00,879 Stand by, United 811, heavy. 366 00:18:00,946 --> 00:18:02,714 I don't know how many is on board. 367 00:18:02,781 --> 00:18:07,186 200 and-- I don't have the paperwork in front of me here. 368 00:18:07,252 --> 00:18:09,555 Uh, we're too busy right now. 369 00:18:09,621 --> 00:18:11,223 200 and something. 370 00:18:11,290 --> 00:18:12,658 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): OK. 371 00:18:12,724 --> 00:18:14,960 NARRATOR: Six minutes from the airport, the crew 372 00:18:15,027 --> 00:18:18,197 now had to slow the overweight plane for landing. 373 00:18:18,263 --> 00:18:19,898 But the effect of this was unknown. 374 00:18:23,735 --> 00:18:25,704 What's going to happen when I start coming out 375 00:18:25,771 --> 00:18:29,842 with flaps and landing gear? 376 00:18:29,908 --> 00:18:33,245 We're either going to land on the airport in the water 377 00:18:33,312 --> 00:18:36,815 or downtown Honolulu. 378 00:18:36,882 --> 00:18:38,851 OK, inboards are coming to ten. 379 00:18:38,917 --> 00:18:41,954 How do the controls feel? 380 00:18:42,020 --> 00:18:42,888 All right, so far. 381 00:18:45,691 --> 00:18:47,125 NARRATOR: But the flaps were damaged 382 00:18:47,192 --> 00:18:49,127 and could not fully extend. 383 00:18:49,194 --> 00:18:52,764 This meant that flight 811 would have to land dangerously fast. 384 00:18:56,835 --> 00:18:58,036 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): United 811, heavy. 385 00:18:58,103 --> 00:18:59,838 Do you have the airport in sight? 386 00:18:59,905 --> 00:19:01,473 It's over here to the right, Captain. 387 00:19:01,540 --> 00:19:02,708 OK. 388 00:19:02,774 --> 00:19:04,042 OK, we have the airport. 389 00:19:04,109 --> 00:19:06,678 United 811, heavy. 390 00:19:06,745 --> 00:19:09,915 SPEAKER (ON RADIO): 811 is clear to land, eight left. 391 00:19:09,982 --> 00:19:11,049 Equipment standing by. 392 00:19:11,116 --> 00:19:15,087 Wind at 05012. 393 00:19:15,153 --> 00:19:16,655 Clear to land. 394 00:19:16,722 --> 00:19:20,425 Eight left, United 811, heavy. 395 00:19:20,492 --> 00:19:23,929 NARRATOR: As the unstable 747 lined up for landing, 396 00:19:23,996 --> 00:19:26,999 the pilots knew they would only have one attempt. 397 00:19:27,065 --> 00:19:29,067 But even if they got it on the runway, 398 00:19:29,134 --> 00:19:31,136 the nagging question remained. 399 00:19:31,203 --> 00:19:34,640 Would the stress of impact cause the damaged and overweight 400 00:19:34,706 --> 00:19:36,575 aircraft to disintegrate? 401 00:19:43,682 --> 00:19:46,451 Severely damaged, with an unstable airframe, 402 00:19:46,518 --> 00:19:49,621 losing altitude, and on only two engines, 403 00:19:49,688 --> 00:19:53,492 flight 811 began its final approach to Honolulu airport. 404 00:19:57,329 --> 00:19:59,031 Two-engine approach. 405 00:19:59,097 --> 00:20:00,098 Two-engine approach. 406 00:20:02,601 --> 00:20:04,770 We still had no idea how far off the ground we were, 407 00:20:04,836 --> 00:20:06,538 if we were going to make it to Honolulu or not. 408 00:20:06,605 --> 00:20:08,941 But that seemed like an appropriate time, 409 00:20:09,007 --> 00:20:10,876 if we're somewhere around land, that we're probably going 410 00:20:10,943 --> 00:20:14,580 to try and land somewhere to get the passengers 411 00:20:14,646 --> 00:20:15,881 in their brace positions. 412 00:20:15,948 --> 00:20:17,783 So that's when we started yelling for them 413 00:20:17,849 --> 00:20:19,518 to get down to brace positions. 414 00:20:19,585 --> 00:20:25,958 Every molecule in my body combined to express, 415 00:20:26,024 --> 00:20:30,228 get this damn airplane on the ground. 416 00:20:30,295 --> 00:20:32,364 How are we doing on the hydraulics? 417 00:20:32,431 --> 00:20:35,233 Hydraulics are good. 418 00:20:35,300 --> 00:20:37,603 We got brakes? 419 00:20:37,669 --> 00:20:39,671 Normal hydraulics. 420 00:20:39,738 --> 00:20:41,073 So we got brakes. 421 00:20:41,139 --> 00:20:46,345 But, uh-- you're only going to have reversing on one and one. 422 00:20:46,411 --> 00:20:48,714 Though I thought maybe there was a chance that we were going 423 00:20:48,780 --> 00:20:51,149 to actually be able to attempt to land, 424 00:20:51,216 --> 00:20:52,684 the thought came to my mind. 425 00:20:52,751 --> 00:20:54,019 What happens now? 426 00:20:54,086 --> 00:20:57,489 Do we-- on impact, do we explode? 427 00:20:57,556 --> 00:21:01,360 Do we fall out this huge hole? 428 00:21:01,426 --> 00:21:03,829 NARRATOR: Despite dumping fuel, the aircraft was 429 00:21:03,895 --> 00:21:05,364 still critically overweight. 430 00:21:05,430 --> 00:21:06,665 192. 431 00:21:06,732 --> 00:21:08,667 NARRATOR: But without full flaps to keep it in the air, 432 00:21:08,734 --> 00:21:10,302 it had to approach fast. 433 00:21:10,369 --> 00:21:11,703 1,000 down. 434 00:21:11,770 --> 00:21:14,206 NARRATOR: The danger was that the undercarriage would shear 435 00:21:14,272 --> 00:21:16,675 off and the plane break up. 436 00:21:16,742 --> 00:21:17,976 A dot and a half high. 437 00:21:22,080 --> 00:21:27,819 190. 438 00:21:27,886 --> 00:21:32,758 185. 439 00:21:32,824 --> 00:21:33,558 A little slow. 440 00:21:33,625 --> 00:21:35,260 A little slow, Dave. 441 00:21:35,327 --> 00:21:36,228 It's below what we want. 442 00:21:43,435 --> 00:21:44,569 Coming up on the glide slope. 443 00:21:47,205 --> 00:21:48,940 OK. 444 00:21:49,007 --> 00:21:50,008 Let's try the gear. 445 00:21:52,744 --> 00:21:54,646 NARRATOR: No one knew if the explosion 446 00:21:54,713 --> 00:21:56,314 damaged the landing gear. 447 00:21:56,381 --> 00:21:58,283 I remember Laura saying to me that she didn't 448 00:21:58,350 --> 00:21:59,985 hear the landing gear go down. 449 00:22:00,052 --> 00:22:00,819 And it was loud. 450 00:22:00,886 --> 00:22:02,120 You know, it was still loud. 451 00:22:02,187 --> 00:22:04,322 And I didn't hear the landing gear go down. 452 00:22:04,389 --> 00:22:05,724 So that's another thought-- 453 00:22:05,791 --> 00:22:07,325 maybe they can't get the landing gear down. 454 00:22:07,392 --> 00:22:11,029 Maybe it's not down. 455 00:22:11,096 --> 00:22:13,532 You got the gear down. 456 00:22:13,598 --> 00:22:15,267 We're clear to land, and everything's taken 457 00:22:15,333 --> 00:22:16,635 care of, as far as we know. 458 00:22:27,345 --> 00:22:32,484 195. 459 00:22:32,551 --> 00:22:33,351 Half a dot high. 460 00:22:37,055 --> 00:22:38,323 Looking-- looking good. 461 00:22:41,026 --> 00:22:46,031 192. 462 00:22:46,098 --> 00:22:47,065 195. 463 00:22:47,132 --> 00:22:47,999 Coming off in the power. 464 00:22:51,403 --> 00:22:52,204 100 feet. 465 00:22:58,443 --> 00:22:59,244 50 feet. 466 00:23:04,816 --> 00:23:05,617 Center thhe trim. 467 00:23:05,684 --> 00:23:06,485 Center the trim. 468 00:23:10,188 --> 00:23:12,724 30. 469 00:23:12,791 --> 00:23:13,592 10. 470 00:23:18,029 --> 00:23:20,098 Zero. 471 00:23:20,165 --> 00:23:20,966 We're on. 472 00:23:25,937 --> 00:23:28,473 Gear's holding. 473 00:23:28,540 --> 00:23:29,508 LEONARD JENKINS: We landed. 474 00:23:29,574 --> 00:23:30,776 It felt fast. 475 00:23:30,842 --> 00:23:32,778 And that was my next concern-- is that we weren't going 476 00:23:32,844 --> 00:23:34,212 to stop at the end of the runway, 477 00:23:34,279 --> 00:23:35,580 that we were just going to keep going. 478 00:23:46,925 --> 00:23:50,362 And all of a sudden, we were slowing down, slowing down. 479 00:23:50,428 --> 00:23:53,165 And I said, oh my god, we've landed. 480 00:23:53,231 --> 00:23:55,167 We're on the ground. 481 00:23:55,233 --> 00:23:58,003 And the people started applauding. 482 00:24:08,013 --> 00:24:11,249 DAVID CRONIN: Probably the best landing I've ever made. 483 00:24:11,316 --> 00:24:14,319 When we finally stopped on the runway, 484 00:24:14,386 --> 00:24:18,490 we deployed all 10 chutes, and the flight attendants 485 00:24:18,557 --> 00:24:22,227 evacuated all the passengers. 486 00:24:22,294 --> 00:24:24,296 LEONARD JENKINS: It's amazing how fast everyone went. 487 00:24:24,362 --> 00:24:28,733 My understanding is, like, less than 45 seconds, 330 people 488 00:24:28,800 --> 00:24:31,369 were off the airplane. 489 00:24:31,436 --> 00:24:33,271 BRUCE LAMPERT: We were probably 20 feet off the ground, 490 00:24:33,338 --> 00:24:35,407 and I would have stepped out of the airplane without a slide. 491 00:24:35,473 --> 00:24:37,342 I wanted to get off so bad. 492 00:24:37,409 --> 00:24:38,844 Fortunately, there was a slide. 493 00:24:38,910 --> 00:24:41,713 I stepped into the abyss, fell into the slide, 494 00:24:41,780 --> 00:24:43,849 flew down to the bottom of the thing, 495 00:24:43,915 --> 00:24:48,587 and then you hit, feet running. 496 00:24:48,653 --> 00:24:50,922 LAURA BRENTLINGER: The slide kind of kicked me up and flew 497 00:24:50,989 --> 00:24:54,092 me up into the air, and my thought was, oh my god, 498 00:24:54,159 --> 00:24:55,560 I'm going to survive this whole thing, 499 00:24:55,627 --> 00:24:58,396 and I'm going to get wiped out here on the evacuation. 500 00:24:58,463 --> 00:25:00,665 Because it just really threw me. 501 00:25:00,732 --> 00:25:02,901 And I landed and scraped up my legs 502 00:25:02,968 --> 00:25:05,837 pretty badly, and landed on my feet. 503 00:25:05,904 --> 00:25:09,407 And it wasn't until that moment that I had the sense of, 504 00:25:09,474 --> 00:25:11,610 I'm here, I'm OK, I'm on the ground. 505 00:25:15,146 --> 00:25:18,783 DAVID CRONIN: When we got all our switches off, 506 00:25:18,850 --> 00:25:20,685 I ran through the airplane, made sure there 507 00:25:20,752 --> 00:25:23,321 wasn't no one else on the airplane, came up to the door-- 508 00:25:23,388 --> 00:25:24,189 one left-- 509 00:25:24,256 --> 00:25:25,957 and went down the slide. 510 00:25:26,024 --> 00:25:27,425 And I came around the front, and I 511 00:25:27,492 --> 00:25:29,394 saw that humongous hole in the side, 512 00:25:29,461 --> 00:25:30,762 and I just couldn't believe it. 513 00:25:38,136 --> 00:25:39,537 By the grace of god, we made it. 514 00:25:39,604 --> 00:25:41,940 And it was an awesome experience. 515 00:25:42,007 --> 00:25:45,210 I would never want to go through that again. 516 00:25:45,277 --> 00:25:46,478 LINDA BAHNA: It was crazy. 517 00:25:46,544 --> 00:25:47,479 It was wild. 518 00:25:47,545 --> 00:25:56,855 It was scary, all at the same time, 519 00:25:56,922 --> 00:25:59,357 I just thought that that was the end, that we were going to die. 520 00:25:59,424 --> 00:26:02,127 I mean, that was my first thought-- 521 00:26:02,193 --> 00:26:03,595 that this is the end. 522 00:26:08,633 --> 00:26:10,402 NARRATOR: But for the families of the nine people 523 00:26:10,468 --> 00:26:13,939 who were killed, the ordeal was just beginning. 524 00:26:14,005 --> 00:26:18,643 Kevin and Susan Campbell's son, Lee, had been flying home. 525 00:26:18,710 --> 00:26:21,146 KEVIN CAMPBELL: About 3:00 in the afternoon, 526 00:26:21,212 --> 00:26:25,550 I think they said that there was no New Zealanders involved. 527 00:26:25,617 --> 00:26:29,454 But we just knew that it was Lee. 528 00:26:29,521 --> 00:26:32,357 And then, about, I suppose, 1/4 of an hour later, 529 00:26:32,424 --> 00:26:35,160 we got a phone call from Chicago. 530 00:26:35,226 --> 00:26:37,295 And they just said that they regret 531 00:26:37,362 --> 00:26:41,366 to inform us that our son was missing, presumed dead. 532 00:26:41,433 --> 00:26:44,903 And I guess about another hour after that, 533 00:26:44,970 --> 00:26:46,838 a policeman arrived at the door. 534 00:26:46,905 --> 00:26:48,673 And he took one look at us, and he says, 535 00:26:48,740 --> 00:26:51,609 I can see that you've had the news. 536 00:26:51,676 --> 00:26:53,678 So it was just-- 537 00:26:53,745 --> 00:26:57,716 just an awful, awful day. 538 00:26:57,782 --> 00:27:02,020 And it certainly didn't get much better for a long, long time. 539 00:27:08,693 --> 00:27:11,162 NARRATOR: Although Lee's body had not been recovered, 540 00:27:11,229 --> 00:27:13,798 the Campbells flew straight to the wrecked aircraft 541 00:27:13,865 --> 00:27:15,266 in Honolulu. 542 00:27:15,333 --> 00:27:18,136 KEVIN CAMPBELL: Your initial feeling is that you want to be 543 00:27:18,203 --> 00:27:24,542 as close to the spot where your relative died, 544 00:27:24,609 --> 00:27:25,944 and that was the aircraft. 545 00:27:26,011 --> 00:27:32,150 So we had to immediately go and see the aircraft. 546 00:27:32,217 --> 00:27:34,252 SUSAN CAMPBELL: The damage inside was horrific. 547 00:27:34,319 --> 00:27:36,554 Just a total mess. 548 00:27:36,621 --> 00:27:38,823 And the hole in the side of the aircraft 549 00:27:38,890 --> 00:27:41,926 was much bigger than I had thought it would be, 550 00:27:41,993 --> 00:27:46,831 even though we had seen television newsreel reports. 551 00:27:46,898 --> 00:27:48,967 And it was so sad to get in and actually 552 00:27:49,034 --> 00:27:51,636 see where Lee's seat had been. 553 00:27:51,703 --> 00:27:54,039 The legs of the seat were still there. 554 00:27:54,105 --> 00:27:57,942 There was a good bit of fuselage beside him, and still a window. 555 00:28:01,312 --> 00:28:02,447 NARRATOR: But the Campbells' desire 556 00:28:02,514 --> 00:28:05,250 to find the cause of Lee's death inevitably 557 00:28:05,316 --> 00:28:08,987 brought them face-to-face with dreadful details. 558 00:28:09,054 --> 00:28:12,857 They took us to the medical examiner's office as well. 559 00:28:12,924 --> 00:28:17,162 Because they had found body parts and that sort of thing. 560 00:28:17,228 --> 00:28:21,533 So they didn't actually show us the body parts, 561 00:28:21,599 --> 00:28:23,101 but they showed us bits and pieces that they 562 00:28:23,168 --> 00:28:25,036 had recovered from the engines. 563 00:28:25,103 --> 00:28:28,907 And we got the medical examiner's report 564 00:28:28,973 --> 00:28:31,476 on what they had recovered. 565 00:28:31,543 --> 00:28:34,612 So you know, we really would have preferred that it was Lee 566 00:28:34,679 --> 00:28:36,147 that went through the engine, because it would 567 00:28:36,214 --> 00:28:38,216 have been an immediate death. 568 00:28:38,283 --> 00:28:40,852 Because it was a four-minute fall down to the ocean, 569 00:28:40,919 --> 00:28:42,887 and we know that the people could have been 570 00:28:42,954 --> 00:28:44,956 alive as they were falling. 571 00:28:45,023 --> 00:28:48,827 And when you think about that, that's just horrific. 572 00:28:48,893 --> 00:28:51,429 NARRATOR: As it became clear that their son's body would 573 00:28:51,496 --> 00:28:53,698 never be found, the Campbells' need 574 00:28:53,765 --> 00:28:56,267 to find the cause of the accident that killed him 575 00:28:56,334 --> 00:28:59,404 grew stronger. 576 00:28:59,471 --> 00:29:01,339 Lee kind of died for nothing. 577 00:29:01,406 --> 00:29:04,075 You know, you've got to find out why he died, 578 00:29:04,142 --> 00:29:07,512 and you've just got to make sure that it never happens again. 579 00:29:16,588 --> 00:29:19,190 NARRATOR: Susan and Kevin Campbell traveled to America 580 00:29:19,257 --> 00:29:21,359 to begin researching possible causes 581 00:29:21,426 --> 00:29:24,162 of the disaster on flight 811. 582 00:29:24,229 --> 00:29:26,631 With the cargo door at the bottom of the ocean, 583 00:29:26,698 --> 00:29:30,869 no one had any hard evidence. 584 00:29:30,935 --> 00:29:33,605 MAN: The engines number 3 and 4-- 585 00:29:33,671 --> 00:29:36,508 NARRATOR: Two months after the accident on flight 811, 586 00:29:36,574 --> 00:29:39,110 the NTSB held preliminary hearings, 587 00:29:39,177 --> 00:29:41,012 and the Campbells were there. 588 00:29:41,079 --> 00:29:43,081 But they soon grew frustrated. 589 00:29:43,148 --> 00:29:46,584 The NTSB would not complete its report for months. 590 00:29:46,651 --> 00:29:49,420 The Campbells wanted answers now. 591 00:29:49,487 --> 00:29:51,189 --the probable cause of this accident 592 00:29:51,256 --> 00:29:52,390 was the sudden opening-- 593 00:29:52,457 --> 00:29:54,993 We certainly weren't going to leave it to the NTSB 594 00:29:55,059 --> 00:29:56,027 to come up with the findings. 595 00:29:56,094 --> 00:29:58,163 We were going to follow through. 596 00:29:58,229 --> 00:29:59,531 And when the hearings ended, they 597 00:29:59,597 --> 00:30:01,099 had said that we could take whatever 598 00:30:01,166 --> 00:30:02,767 we wanted off the press table. 599 00:30:02,834 --> 00:30:06,137 And Susan walked up to the top table and yelled out, 600 00:30:06,204 --> 00:30:08,840 there's a really good set up here. 601 00:30:08,907 --> 00:30:13,545 So I grabbed a box and loaded in all of the documents 602 00:30:13,611 --> 00:30:15,280 that we could find up there. 603 00:30:15,346 --> 00:30:17,782 Kevin's the most honest of people I know. 604 00:30:17,849 --> 00:30:19,817 But here he was, taking something 605 00:30:19,884 --> 00:30:23,788 that we hadn't specifically been told we could take. 606 00:30:23,855 --> 00:30:25,323 KEVIN CAMPBELL: And we're heading out the door 607 00:30:25,390 --> 00:30:28,259 just as the NTSB were arriving back in with the trolley 608 00:30:28,326 --> 00:30:30,261 to pick up all their documents. 609 00:30:30,328 --> 00:30:32,664 So we were out the door and into a taxi and gone. 610 00:30:38,169 --> 00:30:40,972 SUSAN CAMPBELL: So we quickly realized we'd got a really good 611 00:30:41,039 --> 00:30:43,341 set of papers, with a lot of things that hadn't 612 00:30:43,408 --> 00:30:45,710 been released to the public. 613 00:30:45,777 --> 00:30:47,979 We were able to really start our investigation 614 00:30:48,046 --> 00:30:49,447 in earnest at that stage. 615 00:30:56,888 --> 00:30:58,823 NARRATOR: With the NTSB investigation 616 00:30:58,890 --> 00:31:03,228 ongoing, suddenly, the Campbells had an insider's view. 617 00:31:03,294 --> 00:31:06,998 Documents revealed that other cargo doors opened inward, 618 00:31:07,065 --> 00:31:09,033 so the plane's internal pressure helped 619 00:31:09,100 --> 00:31:11,603 jam the door into its frame. 620 00:31:11,669 --> 00:31:15,340 But the cargo door on the 747 opened outward, 621 00:31:15,406 --> 00:31:18,209 allowing for more cargo space, but requiring 622 00:31:18,276 --> 00:31:22,380 a more robust locking system to handle the pressure. 623 00:31:22,447 --> 00:31:25,083 What they do is they build in multiple redundancies 624 00:31:25,149 --> 00:31:26,684 to make sure the door is properly 625 00:31:26,751 --> 00:31:29,887 latched and does not open. 626 00:31:29,954 --> 00:31:34,659 And you build an end to a point that it's extremely improbable 627 00:31:34,726 --> 00:31:36,160 that the door would ever open. 628 00:31:40,098 --> 00:31:44,569 NARRATOR: So what went wrong with flight 811? 629 00:31:44,636 --> 00:31:47,438 Kevin Campbell thought the problem lay in the design 630 00:31:47,505 --> 00:31:48,906 of the locking mechanism. 631 00:31:51,476 --> 00:31:54,479 To lock the cargo door on the 747, 632 00:31:54,545 --> 00:31:57,448 electric motors rotate C-shaped latches 633 00:31:57,515 --> 00:31:59,517 around pins in the door frame. 634 00:31:59,584 --> 00:32:02,387 A handle then moves arms known as locking 635 00:32:02,453 --> 00:32:05,523 sectors over the top of the C latches 636 00:32:05,590 --> 00:32:07,325 to prevent them from reopening. 637 00:32:14,132 --> 00:32:16,401 Campbell, an engineer by training, 638 00:32:16,467 --> 00:32:19,570 built a model to approximate the Boeing design. 639 00:32:19,637 --> 00:32:21,172 KEVIN CAMPBELL: Initially, the locking sectors 640 00:32:21,239 --> 00:32:22,674 were made in aluminum. 641 00:32:22,740 --> 00:32:25,243 And in 1975, Boeing realized that they weren't 642 00:32:25,310 --> 00:32:28,680 strong enough, and they actually doubled up the aluminum 643 00:32:28,746 --> 00:32:30,581 to make it double thickness. 644 00:32:30,648 --> 00:32:33,418 But it still wasn't strong enough. 645 00:32:33,484 --> 00:32:34,919 And a lot of the airlines didn't even 646 00:32:34,986 --> 00:32:37,055 put the doublers on anyway. 647 00:32:37,121 --> 00:32:39,157 NARRATOR: He thought the weakness of the aluminum 648 00:32:39,223 --> 00:32:42,994 increased the risk of the door accidentally opening. 649 00:32:43,061 --> 00:32:45,663 With the aluminum locking sectors, 650 00:32:45,730 --> 00:32:49,300 if the C-locks tried to back-wind, 651 00:32:49,367 --> 00:32:52,570 open electrically, it would just push the locking 652 00:32:52,637 --> 00:32:55,206 sector out of the way. 653 00:32:55,273 --> 00:32:58,009 It just simply wasn't up to the job that it was designed for. 654 00:33:00,678 --> 00:33:02,313 NARRATOR: If Campbell was correct, 655 00:33:02,380 --> 00:33:05,683 this could happen again, and more lives were at stake. 656 00:33:08,619 --> 00:33:11,723 They redoubled their efforts to conduct their own investigation 657 00:33:11,789 --> 00:33:16,728 into the flight that killed their son and eight others. 658 00:33:16,794 --> 00:33:19,664 SUSAN CAMPBELL: We bought a car and set off in the United 659 00:33:19,731 --> 00:33:23,167 States to see as many people who were involved 660 00:33:23,234 --> 00:33:25,770 with the accident as possible. 661 00:33:25,837 --> 00:33:31,342 We started at Seattle, down to Denver, across to Chicago, 662 00:33:31,409 --> 00:33:37,982 through to Washington, DC, down to Kentucky, on to Miami, 663 00:33:38,049 --> 00:33:43,354 and back across to San Diego, back up through San Francisco, 664 00:33:43,421 --> 00:33:45,523 back to Seattle. 665 00:33:45,590 --> 00:33:47,024 And that was just one trip. 666 00:33:49,827 --> 00:33:51,162 NARRATOR: The Campbells soon discovered 667 00:33:51,229 --> 00:33:54,165 a similar incident to flight 811 when cargo 668 00:33:54,232 --> 00:33:56,200 doors had failed mid-flight. 669 00:33:59,303 --> 00:34:03,107 In 1987, two years before flight 811, 670 00:34:03,174 --> 00:34:06,077 a Pan Am 747 had been climbing out 671 00:34:06,144 --> 00:34:10,648 of Heathrow when it had failed to pressurize at 20,000 feet. 672 00:34:10,715 --> 00:34:13,951 The pilots had to turn back. 673 00:34:14,018 --> 00:34:16,354 When it got back to Heathrow, they found that the door was 674 00:34:16,421 --> 00:34:18,389 hanging open an inch and a half at the bottom, 675 00:34:18,456 --> 00:34:21,926 and all of the locks were open. 676 00:34:21,993 --> 00:34:23,561 When it got to the maintenance base, 677 00:34:23,628 --> 00:34:27,165 they found that all of the locking sectors 678 00:34:27,231 --> 00:34:30,168 were either bent or broken. 679 00:34:30,234 --> 00:34:31,602 NARRATOR: Boeing blamed the failure 680 00:34:31,669 --> 00:34:34,138 on mishandling of the door by the ground crew-- 681 00:34:34,205 --> 00:34:35,640 a common problem. 682 00:34:35,706 --> 00:34:39,444 But Campbell thought it didn't explain this problem. 683 00:34:39,510 --> 00:34:41,512 The door had been closed manually. 684 00:34:41,579 --> 00:34:43,714 And what they said happened was that the guy 685 00:34:43,781 --> 00:34:46,050 wound the C-locks closed-- 686 00:34:46,117 --> 00:34:48,586 98 turns of a speed wrench. 687 00:34:48,653 --> 00:34:53,758 He closed the outer handle, and then wound it open again. 688 00:34:53,825 --> 00:34:56,661 And to be in the position that they were found in when 689 00:34:56,727 --> 00:34:58,029 the aircraft got back, he would have 690 00:34:58,096 --> 00:35:00,898 had to wind them open 98 turns, and that's 691 00:35:00,965 --> 00:35:03,100 just absolutely ridiculous. 692 00:35:03,167 --> 00:35:04,902 NARRATOR: Were the doors really getting 693 00:35:04,969 --> 00:35:07,972 mishandled by ground crew, weakening the latches? 694 00:35:08,039 --> 00:35:11,242 Or was there a problem baked into the system? 695 00:35:11,309 --> 00:35:14,979 Campbell suspected an electrical fault. 696 00:35:15,046 --> 00:35:18,282 It had a fault in the S2 master latch lock switch 697 00:35:18,349 --> 00:35:21,452 that should have turned off the power to the door 698 00:35:21,519 --> 00:35:22,920 when the outer handle was closed. 699 00:35:26,624 --> 00:35:28,659 NARRATOR: When the outer handle was closed, 700 00:35:28,726 --> 00:35:31,162 the S2 master lock switch was meant 701 00:35:31,229 --> 00:35:34,699 to disconnect the power supply and stop the C-latch motors 702 00:35:34,765 --> 00:35:35,766 from turning. 703 00:35:35,833 --> 00:35:38,069 So could this have failed, allowing 704 00:35:38,135 --> 00:35:40,471 the motors to open the door? 705 00:35:40,538 --> 00:35:43,608 Boeing asked the airlines to do a simple test. 706 00:35:43,674 --> 00:35:46,277 Close the outer handle, then press 707 00:35:46,344 --> 00:35:48,145 the switch to open the door. 708 00:35:48,212 --> 00:35:51,415 It should remain closed, but in some cases, 709 00:35:51,482 --> 00:35:53,184 the door tried to open. 710 00:35:53,251 --> 00:35:56,120 KEVIN CAMPBELL: When they hit the switch, it actually worked. 711 00:35:56,187 --> 00:35:58,422 Boeing thought, this is not going to work, 712 00:35:58,489 --> 00:35:59,524 but it actually worked. 713 00:35:59,590 --> 00:36:01,692 There was power to the door locks, 714 00:36:01,759 --> 00:36:05,329 with the outer handle closed. 715 00:36:05,396 --> 00:36:07,298 And the lock started to move, and it 716 00:36:07,365 --> 00:36:11,002 started to force the locking sectors out of the way. 717 00:36:11,068 --> 00:36:13,971 And a few days later, the airlines 718 00:36:14,038 --> 00:36:16,874 started ringing in and saying it was damaging their planes. 719 00:36:16,941 --> 00:36:19,377 So Boeing stopped the test, but it 720 00:36:19,443 --> 00:36:22,880 meant that on those aircraft, the S2 switch had failed, which 721 00:36:22,947 --> 00:36:25,583 is a silent failure, and all of those aircraft 722 00:36:25,650 --> 00:36:29,620 were likely to have the same problem as 811. 723 00:36:29,687 --> 00:36:31,556 They were just waiting for a short circuit 724 00:36:31,622 --> 00:36:33,291 to open the doors. 725 00:36:33,357 --> 00:36:35,293 NARRATOR: The Campbells now became convinced 726 00:36:35,359 --> 00:36:39,530 that the accident on flight 811 began with a failure of the S2 727 00:36:39,597 --> 00:36:40,698 switch. 728 00:36:40,765 --> 00:36:43,901 Power remained on to the C-latch motors. 729 00:36:43,968 --> 00:36:46,304 All it might take would be a short circuit 730 00:36:46,370 --> 00:36:50,942 in an aging plane's wiring to start the motors up. 731 00:36:51,008 --> 00:36:53,511 The aluminum locking sectors would be through waiting 732 00:36:53,578 --> 00:36:56,347 to stop the latches turning, and the cargo door 733 00:36:56,414 --> 00:36:57,448 could burst open. 734 00:37:04,255 --> 00:37:06,357 The National Transportation Safety Board 735 00:37:06,424 --> 00:37:09,026 determines that the probable cause of this accident 736 00:37:09,093 --> 00:37:10,294 was the sudden-- 737 00:37:10,361 --> 00:37:12,930 NARRATOR: After waiting a year for the NTSB report, 738 00:37:12,997 --> 00:37:14,999 Kevin and Susan Campbell expected 739 00:37:15,066 --> 00:37:17,134 it to match their theory of what had led 740 00:37:17,201 --> 00:37:19,503 to the accident on flight 811. 741 00:37:19,570 --> 00:37:21,772 I'd assumed that we would have a report come out that this was 742 00:37:21,839 --> 00:37:24,175 an electrical malfunction, and were 743 00:37:24,241 --> 00:37:26,744 staggered when they came out and said that the door had 744 00:37:26,811 --> 00:37:27,945 been mishandled. 745 00:37:28,012 --> 00:37:30,514 The report focused entirely on the fact 746 00:37:30,581 --> 00:37:33,484 that the door lock must have been mishandled 747 00:37:33,551 --> 00:37:36,554 by the ramp attendant. 748 00:37:36,621 --> 00:37:38,422 That was disappointing. 749 00:37:38,489 --> 00:37:42,727 And we felt that they must have been at a different hearing 750 00:37:42,793 --> 00:37:45,363 from the one we were at. 751 00:37:45,429 --> 00:37:49,700 NARRATOR: So how had the NTSB come to their conclusion? 752 00:37:49,767 --> 00:37:51,969 There was other evidence that we had found 753 00:37:52,036 --> 00:37:55,806 during our investigation of improper procedures 754 00:37:55,873 --> 00:37:58,976 by the United mechanics and ramp people. 755 00:37:59,043 --> 00:38:01,679 So we were convinced that there was-- 756 00:38:01,746 --> 00:38:04,715 we could use the word, "abuse," being done on the doors. 757 00:38:04,782 --> 00:38:07,218 The doors were sort of abused and weren't 758 00:38:07,284 --> 00:38:08,819 maintained very well. 759 00:38:08,886 --> 00:38:13,758 We concluded that the probable cause was mechanical. 760 00:38:13,824 --> 00:38:16,594 NARRATOR: The Campbells thought the NTSB report was simply 761 00:38:16,661 --> 00:38:20,197 incomplete and incorrect. 762 00:38:20,264 --> 00:38:24,669 What they said happened was, the door was closed. 763 00:38:24,735 --> 00:38:27,471 The locks didn't fully close. 764 00:38:27,538 --> 00:38:32,710 The doors partially closed, just hanging on the pins. 765 00:38:32,777 --> 00:38:34,111 And then, they closed the outer handle, 766 00:38:34,178 --> 00:38:37,014 but that just simply can't happen. 767 00:38:37,081 --> 00:38:40,084 Because that part of the locking sector is still intact. 768 00:38:40,151 --> 00:38:43,220 It just simply can't happen. 769 00:38:43,287 --> 00:38:46,290 You can't close the outer handle, unless these are 770 00:38:46,357 --> 00:38:49,193 in the fully locked position. 771 00:38:49,260 --> 00:38:52,129 It's the only way that the outer handle will close. 772 00:38:52,196 --> 00:38:54,999 And just closing this manually, you 773 00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:58,602 can't exert enough force to actually damage this part 774 00:38:58,669 --> 00:38:59,970 of the locking sector. 775 00:39:00,037 --> 00:39:02,173 All it does is just backs up against there. 776 00:39:02,239 --> 00:39:04,141 If the locks aren't fully closed, 777 00:39:04,208 --> 00:39:07,144 it just simply backs up against them and goes no further. 778 00:39:15,953 --> 00:39:18,889 NARRATOR: The Campbells didn't accept the NTSB findings 779 00:39:18,956 --> 00:39:19,757 and kept digging. 780 00:39:28,632 --> 00:39:31,435 After the Pan Am incident in 1987, 781 00:39:31,502 --> 00:39:34,138 it turned out that Boeing had issued a directive 782 00:39:34,205 --> 00:39:37,241 to the airlines on how to correct the weak aluminum 783 00:39:37,308 --> 00:39:39,944 locking sectors. 784 00:39:40,010 --> 00:39:42,246 RON SCHLEEDE: The directive that came out 785 00:39:42,313 --> 00:39:45,282 was to replace the aluminum sectors with steel 786 00:39:45,349 --> 00:39:47,151 sectors that could not be bent. 787 00:39:47,218 --> 00:39:50,554 And there were additionally some interim requirements 788 00:39:50,621 --> 00:39:53,958 for inspections to be performed until what 789 00:39:54,024 --> 00:39:56,627 they call terminating action-- the steel 790 00:39:56,694 --> 00:39:57,928 sectors were installed. 791 00:40:01,665 --> 00:40:03,467 NARRATOR: The Federal Aviation Administration 792 00:40:03,534 --> 00:40:06,470 required these improvements but gave the airlines 793 00:40:06,537 --> 00:40:08,038 18 months to comply. 794 00:40:14,945 --> 00:40:17,548 Within a year, Lee Campbell and eight others 795 00:40:17,615 --> 00:40:26,757 would die on flight 811. 796 00:40:26,824 --> 00:40:29,360 After the deaths, the FAA instantly 797 00:40:29,426 --> 00:40:32,696 shortened the deadline for fixing the cargo door 798 00:40:32,763 --> 00:40:35,599 from 18 months to just 30 days. 799 00:40:40,437 --> 00:40:44,308 Still thinking the NTSB got it wrong, 800 00:40:44,375 --> 00:40:47,278 the Campbells took their case to the press 801 00:40:47,344 --> 00:40:49,613 and were invited to United Airlines. 802 00:40:49,680 --> 00:40:51,015 KEVIN CAMPBELL: One of them actually 803 00:40:51,081 --> 00:40:56,120 broke down, because they'd never had to meet next of kin before. 804 00:40:56,187 --> 00:41:00,291 And Eddie ended up with the vice president of United 805 00:41:00,357 --> 00:41:03,594 taking us around the maintenance facility. 806 00:41:03,661 --> 00:41:05,796 And he had people running off in all directions 807 00:41:05,863 --> 00:41:09,366 just to get the information that we wanted, questions answered. 808 00:41:09,433 --> 00:41:12,136 We could go anywhere that we wanted. 809 00:41:12,203 --> 00:41:15,506 And we just-- everything was laid on for us, 810 00:41:15,573 --> 00:41:17,608 because at that stage, they realized 811 00:41:17,675 --> 00:41:21,579 that we really did know what we were talking about. 812 00:41:21,645 --> 00:41:25,783 NARRATOR: Other families of the victims added pressure. 813 00:41:25,850 --> 00:41:29,186 The vital piece of evidence, flight 811's cargo door, 814 00:41:29,253 --> 00:41:33,557 still laid 2 miles down in the Pacific Ocean. 815 00:41:33,624 --> 00:41:36,093 With headlines driving up public interest, 816 00:41:36,160 --> 00:41:41,732 the NTSB commissioned the US Navy to search for it. 817 00:41:41,799 --> 00:41:45,169 100 miles south of Honolulu, a deep submersible 818 00:41:45,236 --> 00:41:46,737 began to trawl the seabed. 819 00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:51,008 KEVIN CAMPBELL: We went to Honolulu 820 00:41:51,075 --> 00:41:54,612 and waited there while they had their attempts. 821 00:41:54,678 --> 00:41:56,747 And they finally recovered the door 822 00:41:56,814 --> 00:41:59,717 from 14,000 feet of water, which was the deepest 823 00:41:59,783 --> 00:42:02,653 recovery ever at that time. 824 00:42:02,720 --> 00:42:04,655 And we were phoned within an hour 825 00:42:04,722 --> 00:42:07,424 of it coming out of the water. 826 00:42:07,491 --> 00:42:10,027 NARRATOR: The recovered door came under intense scrutiny. 827 00:42:14,465 --> 00:42:18,969 Then, in June 1991, another incident appeared to confirm 828 00:42:19,036 --> 00:42:20,337 the Campbells' theory. 829 00:42:20,404 --> 00:42:24,108 A four-year-old United 747 was sitting on the apron in New 830 00:42:24,174 --> 00:42:27,144 York when the C-latch motor started up 831 00:42:27,211 --> 00:42:29,413 and the door opened itself. 832 00:42:29,480 --> 00:42:33,117 After recovery of the door was that in fact, 833 00:42:33,183 --> 00:42:35,219 the actual pieces had-- 834 00:42:35,286 --> 00:42:37,321 NARRATOR: Finally, the NTSB publicly 835 00:42:37,388 --> 00:42:39,423 issued a revised report that concurred 836 00:42:39,490 --> 00:42:41,225 with the Campbells' version. 837 00:42:41,292 --> 00:42:45,329 There was an inadvertent failure of either the switch 838 00:42:45,396 --> 00:42:48,866 or the wiring that caused an uncommanded opening 839 00:42:48,933 --> 00:42:50,534 of the door. 840 00:42:50,601 --> 00:42:52,536 KEVIN CAMPBELL: It's nice that other people know that you're 841 00:42:52,603 --> 00:42:56,006 right and had been all along, and that the support that they 842 00:42:56,073 --> 00:42:59,810 had given you was vindicated. 843 00:42:59,877 --> 00:43:01,345 NARRATOR: The Campbells spent thousands 844 00:43:01,412 --> 00:43:04,949 of dollars of their own money on their campaign. 845 00:43:05,015 --> 00:43:07,885 They were never interested in a financial settlement for Lee's 846 00:43:07,952 --> 00:43:10,354 death, but they did persuade United 847 00:43:10,421 --> 00:43:12,423 and Boeing to set up a university 848 00:43:12,489 --> 00:43:15,392 scholarship in his name. 849 00:43:15,459 --> 00:43:16,694 SUSAN CAMPBELL: I couldn't have lived 850 00:43:16,760 --> 00:43:20,731 with myself if we had done no investigating ourselves. 851 00:43:20,798 --> 00:43:23,867 It was just something we both felt we needed to do. 852 00:43:23,934 --> 00:43:25,302 We didn't even discuss it. 853 00:43:25,369 --> 00:43:27,972 We just knew that's what we would do. 854 00:43:28,038 --> 00:43:28,839 Yeah. 855 00:43:34,878 --> 00:43:37,748 NARRATOR: For some of the survivors of flight 811, 856 00:43:37,815 --> 00:43:40,217 the cost has been heavy. 857 00:43:40,284 --> 00:43:42,252 Each crew member handled it differently. 858 00:43:42,319 --> 00:43:46,223 I know there are still two crew members that have never 859 00:43:46,290 --> 00:43:49,326 set foot on an aircraft again. 860 00:43:49,393 --> 00:43:51,428 It was very difficult for me. 861 00:43:51,495 --> 00:43:56,233 I was diagnosed with severe post-traumatic stress disorder. 862 00:43:56,300 --> 00:43:58,202 You can't reason. 863 00:43:58,268 --> 00:43:59,403 You can't think. 864 00:43:59,470 --> 00:44:03,941 Making the slightest decision is very difficult. 865 00:44:04,008 --> 00:44:05,876 You're just at a total loss. 866 00:44:05,943 --> 00:44:08,946 So it was very difficult to cope with.